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Summary
Since the beginning of the global economic crisis, investors have flocked to bond funds, and especially
corporate bond funds, viewing them as the “safest” vehicles for their capital. However, bond funds are
subject to fragilities originating from the first-mover advantage problem: when investors cash out, the
cost of compensating them amplifies the funds’ price decline, making it costlier for other investors to
remain. Moreover, three other conditions—general market illiquidity, lower fund liquidity, and the
prevalence of retail investors—accentuate the financial fragility of corporate bond funds. Academic
research shows that when corporate bond fund managers have to trade illiquid corporate bonds after
investors redeem shares en masse, the subsequent demand shock in the secondary bond market results
predictably in significant negative effects to the real economy. This brief looks at the fragility of corporate
bond funds and offers policy options to combat these conditions and mitigate their wider effects.
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From the beginning of 2008 to the spring of 2013, as fixed income fund assets
were increasing several times faster than equity, money market, allocation,
and all other fund assets combined, total bond fund assets nearly doubled.
This presents a challenge to researchers, regulators, and
practitioners. Flows into and out of equity funds have
been thoroughly researched over the past few decades,
but there has been stunningly little investigation into
the flow behavior of bond funds, which behave rather
differently from equity funds and now account for a
formidable portion of all investment.
Over that same five year period, investment in
corporate bond funds, specifically, roughly tripled
from $600 billion to $1.7 trillion.1 These funds began
to comprise a significant part of the overall corporate
bond market by the end of 2013, which at that time
was worth approximately $7.5 trillion, or close to half
the size of the equity market. And when scanning the
entire universe of bond funds, it is even more noteworthy that corporate bond funds accounted for 57% of
all fixed income funds in 2013 [Figure 1]. Given the
prominence of corporate bond funds, their potential
market impact, and the stark contrasts to equity funds
(i.e., corporate bond funds have higher turnover rates
and shorter investment horizons despite trading in a
market with lower liquidity), these vehicles are the best
place to start shedding light on the largely dark field of
bond fund flows.

summary
• Since the beginning of the global economic crisis, investors
have flocked to bond funds, and especially corporate bond
funds, viewing them as the “safest” vehicles for their capital.
• However, bond funds are subject to fragilities originating from
the first-mover advantage problem: when investors cash out,
the cost of compensating them amplifies the funds’ price decline, making it costlier for other investors to remain. Moreover,
three other conditions—general market illiquidity, lower fund
liquidity, and the prevalence of retail investors—accentuate
the financial fragility of corporate bond funds.
• Academic research shows that when corporate bond fund managers have to trade illiquid corporate bonds after investors
redeem shares en masse, the subsequent demand shock in
the secondary bond market results predictably in significant
negative effects to the real economy.
• Several options are available to combat the potential fragility in
corporate bond funds and mitigate their wider effects: (1) have
the funds increase their liquidity by maintaining more cash on
hand; (2) institute emergency redemption rules during times
of macroeconomic distress; or (3) obviate the problem of first
movers by changing the way funds calculate redemption prices.
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In this brief, I will break down the
research I conducted with my coauthors, Hao Jiang and David Ng, on
fragility in corporate bond funds and
offer suggestions, both policy-oriented
and industry-based, for minimizing
the potential for future runs and rapid
price depression that might originate
from the structure of bond funds—an
outcome that could lead to negative
macroeconomic effects.2

FIGURE 1: TOTAL NET ASSETS AND DOLLAR FLOWS OF ACTIVE CORPORATE
BOND FUNDS

The Problem of First
Movers and Accelerated
Runs
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The vast literature on equity fund
flows reveals clearly that those funds
are very sensitive to good past performance and not especially sensitive
to bad past performance. Therefore,
there is no particularly strong concern
that investors will rush to redeem
their equity fund shares when the
market encounters negative events,
which would have the effect of further
hurting the returns for the investors
who choose to remain fund owners.
In other words, the fragility of equity
funds is quite limited in most cases,
except for funds holding very illiquid
assets.3
Flows into corporate bond funds,
however, do not behave in the same
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This figure shows total net assets (TNA) and dollar flows of actively managed corporate bond funds from 1991 to
2014 index corporate bond funds, exchange traded funds, and exchange traded notes from the CRSP are excluded.

way. Under some circumstances, their
outflows are actually more sensitive
to bad performance than their inflows
are sensitive to good performance. So
in the face of a negative market event,
investors are much more likely to
exchange their fund shares for money.
Portfolio adjustments then would
occur in the days (or weeks, depending
on how infrequently the assets trade)
after investors redeem their shares, but

investors receive money equal to the
price of the fund the day they withdraw. There is an obvious mismatch
here between fund illiquidity and the
investor’s claim to immediate (i.e.,
same day) liquidity. When managers
are forced to sell the underlying assets
of the fund to compensate redeemers,
this imposes extra costs on the investors who remain in the fund, since
any necessary liquidation costs are not

and 2014 – the only years for which we have reliable and
consistent data from CRSP. Index funds, ETFs, and ETNs
were excluded from analysis so that we could compare
our findings to the research on actively managed equity
funds. The median share-class size in our sample was $59
million, and the median fund age was 6.88 years. Our final
dataset included 4,679 unique share classes and 1,660
unique corporate bond funds.
3 Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), “Payoff Complementarities and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Mutual Fund

Outflows,” available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0304405X10000759.
4 Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008), “Transparency and the
Corporate Bond Market,” available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082459. For context,
three-fifths of fixed income trading is centered around U.S.
Treasury securities.
5 Different pricing service companies or securities dealers
might price underlying bonds differently, and bond fund
managers can always override these price recommenda-

notes
Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz, and Shin (2014), “Market
Tantrums and Monetary Policy,” available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409092; and
Investment Company Institute Fact Book (2014), available
at https://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf.
2 This brief is based extensively off Goldstein, Jiang, and
Ng (2015), “Investor Flows and Fragility in Corporate Bond
Funds,” available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2596948. We analyzed actively managed corporate bond funds in the years between 1992
1

2
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fully reflected in the price received by
the redeemers but are absorbed by the
remaining investors over time. This is
what economists call negative externalities. These dynamics lead to what
is known as a first-mover advantage
problem. Put simply, if the price of
a bond fund decreases, it could be
expensive as an investor to remain in
the fund because a price decline will
be amplified by the costs of adjusting
the fund portfolio to compensate the
investors who cashed out first.
In addition to the problem of first
movers, the amplified costs imposed
by redemptions are accelerated in corporate bond funds by the general illiquidity of the underlying assets. Even
though corporate bonds comprise
over 20% of all bonds outstanding
in the U.S., as previously noted, they
account for only about 2.5-3.0% of
all U.S. bond trading.4 Illiquid assets
come with higher liquidation costs,
which are further heightened during
periods of overall market illiquidity
(see below). But not only are corporate bond funds vulnerable to the
aforementioned negative externalities
and infrequent trading, they also must
endure higher trading costs than other
types of funds, as well as uncertain
pricing.5

The Behavior of
Corporate Bond Fund
Flows
The research that my co-authors and
I conducted recently tested three
hypotheses concerning how investors
in corporate bond funds make investment decisions. All three suppositions
were confirmed in the data and guide
the recommendations that follow.
• Hypothesis 1: Liquidation costs
imposed from massive outflows will
be greater during periods of overall
market illiquidity, when trading
costs are higher and pricing is more
uncertain. In our implementation, we chose the VIX index, the
TED spread, and Fed Funds rates
as proxies for aggregate illiquidity
and uncertainty, which were used
to predict bond fund flows. We
showed that they tend to amplify
the sensitivity of outflows to bad
performance.
• Hypothesis 2: Funds with lower
asset liquidity—or, in our analysis,
less cash—will be even more sensitive to bad performance and will
experience greater outflows. In our
sample, the funds held, on average,
3.5% of their assets in cash, but the
amount varied widely with a standard deviation of 10%. The top 1%

notes
tions and mark their own prices.
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), “Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Fluctuations,” available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17021.
7 Goldsteing, Jiang, and Ng (2015).
8 See Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng for a case study on fund
liquidity levels involving PIMCO after the departure of the
company’s founder and most visible manager, “Bond King”
Bill Gross.
6
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of funds held about 46.7% of their
assets in cash while the bottom 1%
of funds were actually leveraged and
had negative cash holdings of about
36.72%. Overall, less than a fifth of
the funds were leveraged with negative cash holdings.
• Hypothesis 3: The effect of illiquidity on the sensitivity of outflows
to bad performance will weaken
the more that fund ownership is
composed of institutional instead
of retail investors. We were able to
conclude that the large size of institutional investors helped them to
internalize the negative externalities.
General market illiquidity, lower
fund liquidity, and the prevalence
of retail investors are all signals for
financial fragility in corporate bond
funds recognized both by investors,
who react more strongly to bad news
in large part because of these conditions, and fund managers themselves.
Given the high costs associated with
fragility, it might be expected that
funds would put measures in place to
mitigate the risks of massive outflows
in response to negative developments.
The SEC allows mutual funds to
charge voluntary redemption fees in
an effort to curb short term trading,
but in practice, these fees are often not
utilized by the industry. Funds com-
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pete aggressively with each other for
investor capital and such redemption
fees are clearly seen as deterrents.

Economic Consequences
and Recommendations
Established academic research shows
that variation in excess bond premiums, or credit risk premiums,
can by itself predict with reasonable
effectiveness certain macroeconomic
outcomes.6 This is important for our
purposes here because when corporate
bond fund managers have to trade
illiquid corporate bonds after investors
redeem shares en masse, the subsequent demand shock in the secondary
bond market can significantly impact
corporate bond prices and excess bond
premiums. To put this another way,
the first-mover advantage problem
sparks a demand problem in the
corporate bond market, resulting in
potentially and predictably significant
negative effects in the real economy.
While the investigation into
corporate bond flows’ influence on real
macroeconomic outcomes is, at this
point, only exploratory, we discovered
that “an unanticipated increase by
one percent in [corporate bond fund]
outflow leads to reductions in future
consumption, investment and output
growth rates over the next several
quarters. The macroeconomic effect
of the outflow shock is quite substantial.”7 Specifically, the GDP growth
rate declined a statistically significant
22 basis points over the subsequent
three quarters after a surprise 1% rise
in bond outflows.
Even with this knowledge, it is
not clear that the potential fragility of
corporate bond funds demand regula-

tory intervention. Some of the problems can be addressed by the funds
themselves. Moreover, regulating one
corner of the financial system could
lead investors to flock to a different
corner, the result of which may be
increased fragility of a different fund
type. This is what happened when the
federal government increased regulation on money market funds after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
Investors then fled quickly into bond
funds. However, it is still the case that
negative externalities may be present
beyond bond funds and are not internalized by them to fully account for
the first-mover advantage problem, so
that some regulation may be prudent.
As for the actual steps that the
industry might consider to combat
fragility in corporate bond funds, several options are available. One option
is to increase liquidity in the funds.
Since funds with higher cash holdings
are not subject to the same sensitivity
as funds with low cash or leveraged
assets, one of the simplest solutions is
then to have funds increase their cash
on hand. It would be better for the
funds to take this action themselves,
but each fund operates without taking
into account the negative externalities they put on the market, and it is
doubtful that few, if any, consider the
aggregate effects of too few funds
maintaining sufficient levels of liquidity. Some guidelines concerning cash
holding could thus be helpful. What
that percentage of assets held in cash
would be is not obvious, and regardless of whether it is the government
or the funds themselves that induce
larger cash holdings, any increase
could be costly for fund performance.8
The second recommendation
4

involves tracking the liquidity of the
overall bond market. As noted, sensitivity increases in times of illiquidity,
therefore outflows might pose systemic risk. In times of U.S. macroeconomic distress, emergency rules could
be instituted, including “suspension
of redemption,” which means that
if more than a certain (to be determined) percentage of outflows occur
on a single day, investors would be
prohibited from pulling their money
out of a fund in order to prevent a
potentially risky chain of events. This
rule could be necessary if the manner in which redemption prices are
calculated (see option three) or the
frequency of trading on the secondary market do not change. Another
emergency rule could be “redemption
in kind.” If a fund finds itself at risk of
a fire sale, the fund could be allowed
to give the investors who are pulling
out their money the underlying assets
instead of cash. This way, investors
internalize the full consequences of
their redemptions on the value of
the assets. This rule is very hard to
implement and, while worth looking
into, may not be the best solution, as
it is difficult to know which assets to
transfer to investors, how they should
be split, etc.
Finally, option three entails
policies that deal with the first-mover
advantage problem and the associated
amplification of outflows by changing the way funds calculate redemption prices. At present, fund prices
do not take into account the effect
of flows for the current trading day.
As a result, the price that investors
get upon redemption is not reflective
of how many other investors have
traded that day. There can be a very
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large difference between the price of a
fund at 4:00 PM on a Tuesday and the
re-calculated price in later days after
liquidations of assets have occurred.
One way to deal with this issue is by
implementing a forward-looking net
asset value (NAV) calculation, in the
spirit of “swing pricing.” Swing pricing takes into account both the last
NAV and the amount of redemptions
during a given day in order to factor
in future liquidation costs. While this
practice is difficult to implement in
the market, it is something that many
other countries have already utilized.
Once the change is made, it could
help alleviate the aforementioned
price uncertainty that can fuel runs.
It is a recommendation supported in
Basel III, implemented in the EU, and

there are, in fact, some multinational
corporations, including BlackRock,
that already use it for their operations
outside the United States.

Conclusion
There is no magic bullet that eliminates all possible fragility inherent in
corporate bond funds. From a greater
economic perspective, it would be
beneficial to eliminate or reduce the
first-mover advantage problem. But
having funds hold more cash, changing the pricing rules of funds, and
restricting redemptions all carry costs
as well. Regulating one part of the
financial system, either from a policy
position or from within the financial
industry, will change the operation

5

of other parts and create new risks,
so implementing any of the options
noted above in a manner that reduces
their costs is just as important as
implementing the changes themselves.
Investors have flocked to bond
funds, especially corporate bond
funds, since the beginning of the
global economic crisis, viewing them
as the “safest” vehicles for their capital.
But bond funds are subject to fragilities originating from the first-mover
advantage problem similar to money
market funds and depository banks.
With a market of their size, doing
nothing to alleviate the negative
implications of the first-mover advantage and reduce accelerated outflows
is likely riskier than attempting to
mitigate the problem in some way.
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